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ABSTRACT: It is widely acknowledged that the responsible introduction of new assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) requires preclin-
ical safety research, including the use of animal models and human embryos. However, the moral sensitivity of human embryo research has
led to regulations and guidance stating that human embryos may only be used for research that cannot also be conducted with animals. We
call this the ‘use animals first’ (UAF) rule. In the field of ART research, this translates into the notion of an ideal chain of consecutive preclinical
research steps, where research using human embryos may only be considered as a further step after promising results have been obtained in
animals first. This may lead to research ethics committees requiring animal studies that are in fact a waste of time and money, while exposing
animals to an infringement of their wellbeing for no good purpose. In this paper, we explore the possible moral arguments behind the UAF-
rule and test their validity. We conclude that there are no convincing grounds for upholding this rule and recommend replacing it.
Key words: ethics / assisted reproductive technologies / preclinical research / animal research / human embryo research / responsible
innovation
Introduction
An important concern with developments in medically assisted repro-
duction is that new techniques or add-ons to existing ones are often
introduced without sufficient preclinical safety and efficacy studies, and
also without meaningful efforts to collect follow-up data. As several
authors have pointed out, the field fails to meet standards of evidence-
based innovation held elsewhere in medicine (Dondorp and de Wert,
2011; Harper et al. 2012, 2017; Sharpe, 2018). This is problematic not
just in terms of the good-quality medical care that fertility patients may
expect for themselves, but also because possible risks of new assisted
reproductive technologies (ARTs) extend to the offspring conceived
with these methods. In the light of this, one would expect the field to
take the safety of its procedures far more seriously than it currently
does. The point was forcefully brought home in a recent review in this
journal of the emerging awareness of the relevance of the ‘developmen-
tal origins hypothesis of health and disease’ for responsible innovation
in reproductive medicine. As the author observes, ‘it seems clear that
the techniques applied in ART do actually affect the growth, develop-
ment and health of offspring, but it is unclear to what extent each of the
techniques does so, what the effects are on short and long-term health
and what the optimal treatment would be’ (Roseboom, 2018).
In the light of these concerns, there is growing support for the view
that new reproductive technologies should only be introduced after
predictive preclinical efficacy and safety studies (Pennings et al., 2007;
Van Steirteghem, 2008; Harper et al., 2012; Provoost et al., 2014;
Mulder et al., 2018; Sharpe, 2018). For preclinical research in this field,
cellular models, animal models (ranging from rodents to non-human
primates) and human embryos can be used, depending on the
research question. However, the moral sensitivity of human embryo
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research has led to regulations and guidance requiring that the use of
human embryos may only be considered for important (basic or pre-
clinical) research questions that cannot be answered through other
means, including animal models. We call this the ‘use animals first’
(UAF) rule.
At the same time, animal research is morally sensitive as well, as is
reflected in the growing support of the so-called 3Rs, calling researchers
to ‘replace, reduce, refine’ the use of research animals wherever pos-
sible (NC3Rs, 2018). Interestingly, the ethical framework for animal
research insists that animals may only be used for research questions
that cannot be answered through other means (Jans et al., 2018). As in
this context ‘other means’ would seem to include research using human
embryos, researchers may find themselves in a catch-22 situation
regarding the prioritization of these two types of preclinical research. In
this paper, we explore the possible moral arguments behind the UAF-
rule and test their validity. Although this rule applies to multiple scien-
tific practices, the scope of this paper is limited to preclinical ART
research. When referring to human embryos as possible research
material, we mean early (<14 days) in vitro embryos of sufficient quality
that are either donated to research during an IVF-treatment procedure,
or embryos especially created for research (‘research embryos’).
The ‘use animals first’ rule
As a general rule, the UAF-rule takes the form of a subsidiarity require-
ment that applies to all forms of human embryo research, regardless
of context and purpose. An early example of this can be found in the
seminal Warnock report (Warnock, 1985) that has not only stood at
the cradle of the British legislation of human embryo research, but has
influenced relevant regulations in other countries as well. In this report
it is said that ‘no one should undertake research on human embryos
the purposes of which could be achieved by the use of other animals
or in some other way’ (p. 63). The argument given for upholding this
rule is that ‘the human embryo is entitled to some added measure of
respect beyond that accorded to other animal subjects’ (p. 62). A simi-
lar position was taken by the Health Council of the Netherlands in an
advisory report commissioned by the Dutch government. According
to the report, human embryo research is acceptable only under condi-
tions, including the condition that ‘it must not be possible to obtain the
envisaged results in any other way (through animal research or cell cul-
ture, for example)’ (Health Council of the Netherlands, 1998, p. 58).
Further examples can be found in professional guidance documents.
For example, the International Society for Stem Cell Research (ISSCR)
states that human embryo research proposals ‘should include a discus-
sion of alternative methods and provide a rationale for […] performing
the experiments in a human rather than animal model system’ (ISSCR,
2016, p. 6).
In many European jurisdictions, such as the Netherlands, Belgium,
the United Kingdom and France, the UAF-rule is enshrined in the law.
For example, following the Dutch embryo law, it is permissible to use
embryos for research only when there is ‘no alternative research
method’ (CBO, 2003), and in the UK, research on human embryos is
only permitted when the Human Fertilisation and Embryology
Authority (HFEA) ‘is satisfied that any proposed use of embryos […]
is necessary for the purposes of the research’ (Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Act, 1990, p. 60). In order to receive a human embryo
research license from the HFEA, ‘the scientists applying for a research
licence are asked to provide a lot of information about the research
they wish to carry out and why the research could not be done using
animal embryos or other types of cells’ (HFEA, 2017).
Ideal chain of ART research steps
More specifically, in guidance pertaining to preclinical ART research,
the UAF-rule translates into a preferred order of research steps in
which animal studies precede human embryo research. For instance,
according to the Health Council of the Netherlands, the ideal order of
research steps involved in the responsible introduction of new ARTs is
as follows: ‘animal-based experimental research, preclinical research
using embryos, randomized trials with patient groups, and follow-up
research among the children’ (Health Council of the Netherlands,
1998, p. 70). This same order of consecutive steps can be found in the
recommendations of ESHRE’s Task Force Ethics and Law (Pennings
et al., 2007) and more recently in papers of a group of leading ART-
scientists, presenting an ‘ideal paradigm’, or ‘pathway’ from basic
physiological to clinical research through intermediate steps of animal
and human embryo research (Brison et al., 2013; Harper et al., 2012,
2017; Mulder et al., 2018). The adjective ‘ideal’ reflects that in practice
this order cannot always be followed. For instance, when a useful ani-
mal model is lacking, or when a question cannot be answered in
research using human embryos, these steps will have to be skipped.
Inevitably that will make it a greater challenge to determine if the step
towards first clinical applications can safely be made.
Implications for scientific
practice
From a purely scientific point of view, there is no such thing as a pre-
ferred order of research-steps other than in terms of always choosing
the optimal way of answering a given research question. In preclinical
ART research, this may involve the use of different kinds of animal
models, but also of human embryos, depending on what would best fit
the precise aims of the study. There is not necessarily a conflict
between this scientific perspective and the UAF-rule. For example, for
many preclinical research questions (e.g. whether a new ART may lead
to successful pregnancies in mammals, or to study transgenerational
safety effects of new ARTs), human embryos are not suitable to begin
with. It is clear that these questions can only be studied in animal mod-
els (Mulder et al., 2018; Sharpe, 2018). Where human embryos are
suitable (e.g. for studying the possible effect of a new ART on gene
expression patterns during embryonic development), doing the same
research with animal embryos would not be as informative, given the
translational distance between those species and humans. As in such a
case the same question cannot be answered in research using animal
embryos, the UAF-rule does not stand in the way of directly moving to
human embryo research.
The notion of an ‘ideal chain’ reflects however a more extensive
interpretation than the above strict reading of the general rule.
According to this interpretation, human embryo research should only
be considered after promising results have first been obtained in ani-
mals, or when it is clear that animal studies cannot contribute at all to
answering the question. When following this interpretation, research
ethics committees will not allow scientists to directly move to human
embryo research as long as prior animal studies might still lead to
1582 Jans et al.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/hum
rep/article/33/9/1581/5055523 by U
niversiteit M
aastricht user on 17 D
ecem
ber 2020
results that are at least partially relevant to answering the research
question. Again, this is not necessarily at odds with the more pragmatic
perspective of science, which always requires balancing the pros and
cons of different approaches, including issues such as costs, uniformity
and easy availability in large numbers. However, deciding this on a case
by case basis is not possible when research ethics committees take the
line that animal research should always precede the use of human
embryos regardless of how useful that prior step would be. Our
impression is that researchers in the field of ART often face difficulties
receiving permission for human embryo research when data from
prior animal studies, more specifically: studies using animal embryos,
are lacking. This is ethically problematic in so far as it may lead to a
waste of valuable research time and money, but also because it vio-
lates a core principle of the ethics of animal research, namely that the
inevitable impact on animal wellbeing should be proportional to the
importance of the benefits to be gained through that research (Jans
et al., 2018).
Themorality of interests
Apart from the quoted line in the Warnock report, we did not come
across any specific ethical justifications for the UAF-rule. It seems to
be taken for granted that using human embryos as research material is
morally more problematic than using animals and should therefore
only be considered when (further) studies using an animal model will
not contribute to the answer of the research question. But how strong
is the argument for this position? In this section, we consider what ani-
mals stand to lose when being used as research material and ask how
the fate of human embryos compares to this.
The strong consensus acknowledges that, in contrast to mere tissues
and cells, animals have a moral standing, which means that we are
obliged to consider their needs and interests when making decisions
affecting them (Warren, 1997). Philosopher McMahan describes this as
the ‘morality of interests’ (MoI), which refers to how the interests of
beings at the receiving end of our actions constrain what we may do to
them (McMahan, 2002). This view is reflected in the European animal
research legislation, which incorporates the Three Rs; Replace, Reduce
and Refine the use of animals for research (European Union, 2010).
The more the use of animals in research leads to pain, discomfort, a
negative psychological impact, or an infringement of species-specific
behavior, the greater the human benefits must be in order for the
research in question to be considered proportional. Preclinical animal
research for testing new ARTs has a relatively low impact on the well-
being of animals, as compared to animal research in other contexts,
such as certain forms of cancer or burns research (Jans et al., 2018).
Nevertheless, all animals in research suffer some extent of discomfort
and/or pain. As preimplantation human embryos by contrast are not
capable of experiencing pain or psychological distress, embryo
research does not have an impact on their wellbeing. Choosing human
embryos instead of animals (when both can be used for answering the
research question) would reduce the total negative impact on well-
being and would in so far be morally preferable.
A reduced level of wellbeing is not the only way in which interests
can be harmed; also premature death can do so and – at least in
humans – taking a life is generally considered to be the greatest pos-
sible infringement on the victim’s interests. In ART research, all animals
(except non-human primates) will ultimately be painlessly killed.
Following McMahan, the wrongness of killing depends on (1) the
amount of good a being loses by dying and (2) the strength of its time-
relative interest in continuing to live. This strength is dependent on
whether, and if so how strongly, a being is psychologically connected
to its future self (McMahan, 2002). In this context, it is less wrong to
kill lower animals (e.g. mice) than higher animals (e.g. non-human pri-
mates), as the latter would lose a more psychologically complex life
and are more strongly connected to their future life because of their
higher psychological features.
What about killing human embryos in or after research? Does this
deprive them of a future life? Clearly, if left-over IVF-embryos are
used, this is not a meaningful question, as those embryos are destined
to perish already prior to being considered as research material
(Pennings and Van Steirteghem, 2004). However, what if human
embryos are especially created to serve as research material? Could
one argue that they are ab initio deprived of a more valuable future life
than even the highest animal? This ‘future like ours argument’ has been
applied to the ethics of abortion by philosopher Don Marquis
(Marquis, 1989). But whatever its worth in that context, the argument
cannot simply be extended to make the case that preimplantation
embryos would be deprived of ‘a future like ours’. Such deprivation
would require a level of connection of a present self to a future self
that goes beyond what can be attributed to an embryo. We conclude
that the MoI does not support the UAF-rule. In fact, it would seem to
rather support the opposite.
Themorality of respect
A second possible line of argument is that a special moral status can be
attributed to human embryos regardless of whether they can be said
to have interests. A reference to this special moral status can, for
example, be found in the quoted argument from the Warnock report
(Warnock, 1985).
An argument to support this claim would have to explain what mor-
ally distinguishes human embryos from animals. This cannot be the
simple fact that they are ‘human’, as that would amount to a speciesist
fallacy. If the argument can be made, it must somehow connect with
why we think human beings have a special moral status and then, sec-
ondly, explain what this entails for human embryos. The main non-
religious answer to the first part of this question is that we consider
(most) humans to be ‘persons’ (DeGrazia, 1997; Warren, 1997;
Harris, 1999), which means that they have a high ‘enough’ degree of
personhood properties, such as ‘moral agency, autonomy, the capacity
for intentional action, rationality, self-awareness, sociability and linguis-
tic ability’ (DeGrazia, 1997, 2008, p. 193).
McMahan speaks of what we owe to persons in terms of the
‘Morality of Respect’ (MoR). Even if some animals (great apes) may
perhaps qualify as borderline persons (DeGrazia, 1997), animals gen-
erally fall below what he calls the ‘person threshold’, which means that
they are not entitled to the same degree of protection as human indivi-
duals. Whereas the use of persons as ‘mere means’ is morally
unacceptable, this does not hold for beings below this threshold: using
them for entirely instrumental purposes can be acceptable under con-
ditions (Jans et al., 2018).
What does this mean for a possible special moral status of early
human embryos? Only for those who regard these as persons does
their moral status have the weight accorded by the MoR. Most people,
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however, accord a more limited moral status to the human embryo.
This is often argued for in terms of those embryos having the capacity to
develop into human beings who will then be persons. Clearly, this is not
enough to grant them the full protection of the MoR, given that even as
‘potential persons’, they are not persons yet. In fact, the widely
endorsed understanding is that in comparison with that of persons, the
special moral status of human embryos and fetuses is initially quite low
and only increases with in utero development. Still, this is in comparison
with persons, not with animals, to whom such a special moral status is
not ascribed at all (apart perhaps from great apes as borderline persons
(DeGrazia, 1997)). The reference to ‘an added measure of respect’ in
theWarnock report suggests that it is on this difference between human
embryos and animals that the UAF-rule rests. However, it is silent about
the opposite conclusion that seems to follow from the MoI.
The interests of oocytes donors
For preclinical safety and efficacy studies in the context of introducing
new ARTs, it will often not be possible to do the research with spare
embryos that are left over from IVF treatment. In those cases,
research embryos will need to be especially created for the purpose,
which requires the use of donated human oocytes. As oocyte dona-
tion for the benefit of science is a morally sensitive practice, this might
be regarded as an argument for the UAF-rule, at least in cases where
the use of spare embryos is not an option. In order to produce mature
oocytes, the donor must undergo hormone stimulation and oocyte
pick-up. The procedure is burdensome and may entail physical risks,
including a risk of the woman developing ovarian hyper stimulation
syndrome (OHSS). However, with careful protocols these risks can
almost completely be avoided (Devroey et al., 2011). Still, in the light
of the demanding nature of the procedure, not many women are will-
ing to volunteer. Indeed, some commentators have argued that the
creation of embryos for the purpose of research can increase the risk
of coercion for women (Baylis, 2000) or might threaten women’s
autonomy (Gerrand, 1993). Financial compensation schemes or so-
called egg-sharing procedures (in which IVF-patients are offered free
or reduced-cost treatment in return for donating part of the mature
oocytes obtained in the process (Blyth, 2002)) have been criticized for
inviting exploitation of vulnerable women. Here again, however, these
risks can be minimized with carefully designed practices of information,
counseling and consent (Mertes and Pennings, 2006). Although it is
certainly true that the challenges of responsibly obtaining mature
human oocytes for preclinical embryo research are an argument for
using spare embryos whenever the research question can be answered
with these as well, we think it is difficult to maintain that these chal-
lenges are so large as to settle the issue in favor of the UAF-rule.
Moreover, it is expected that with new sources of research oocytes,
including oocytes left over from cryostorage for fertility preservation
(Mertes et al., 2012), immature oocytes grown and matured in vitro
(McLaughlin et al., 2018), and stem cell derived oocytes (Segers et al.,
2017), any remaining moral challenges will eventually be overcome.
Conclusion and recommendations
Apparently, the UAF-rule is based on the view that human embryos
have a special moral status, without including the MoI perspective.
When both perspectives are included, it is less clear that the UAF-rule
is morally tenable. In light of this, different scenarios can be considered.
When doing so, we leave aside any possible legal barriers to using or
creating human embryos for research that exist in certain countries.
Assuming that these research options are not categorically forbidden
and therefore unavailable, let us first consider the scenario of preclin-
ical research for which left-over IVF-embryos could be used. As said,
those embryos are destined to perish already prior to being con-
sidered as research material. Using them for research only determines
how they will perish, not whether they will. To maintain that it would
still be morally preferable not to make use of those embryos, but to
create and use animals instead (even if only as sources of gametes and
embryos), strikes us as perverse. However, preclinical ART research
cannot always be performed with left-over IVF embryos. As said, it will
often be necessary to create embryos for the purpose. Would that
change matter? If human embryos have a special moral status, they
should not be created for research that can also be carried out with
morally less offensive research material. But again: is that the case
where animals are concerned that would also have to be created for
the purpose? The least one should say, is that this is not obvious, not
even with the possible support from the argument pertaining to the
morality of asking women to act as oocyte donors. We conclude that
the moral arguments to support the UAF-rule are not evidently
weightier than arguments supporting the opposite view, according to
which animals deserve more protection than human embryos.
As no overriding moral arguments supporting the UAF-rule were found,
we wonder why this rule is so widely supported. Our hypothesis is that it
is based on ‘human prejudice’, which in this case invites the view that
human embryos deserve more respect than even the highest animal, solely
because they belong to the ‘human species’ (Savulescu and Bostrom,
2009). Obviously, this is no valid argument to uphold the UAF-rule.
We recommend that in legal documents and professional guidance,
the UAF-rule is abandoned and replaced by a justificatory framework
that does not a priori favor animal studies over the use of human embryos
in research. The notion of a chain of ART research steps should be modi-
fied accordingly. A core message must remain that the step to the clinic
can only responsibly be made after adequate preclinical safety studies.
Clearly, this should include animal studies aimed at charting potential
health effects of new reproductive technologies at multiple stages of off-
spring development in more than one generation (Mulder et al., 2018;
Sharpe, 2018). However, it should also include early developmental (e.g.
gene expression) research done directly on human embryos that would
bypass the uncertainties that go with animal-based studies (Brison et al.,
2013). With potentially risky reproductive technologies on the horizon
(such as reproduction using stem-cell derived gametes, or genetically
modified gametes or embryos), it is important that optimal use can be
made of either type of morally sensitive research material. As the ill-
founded notion of the greater moral sensitivity of human embryo
research may stand in the way of this, it should be abandoned so as to
avoid waste and increase the relevance of preclinical safety research. In
line with this, research ethics committees assessing protocols for the use
of human embryos in preclinical ART research should refrain from
requiring prior animal studies that are not expected to be informative.
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